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Section 7 of the Charter and
the Principled Assignment of
Legislative Jurisdiction
Alana Klein
I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal law can be bad for one’s health. In recent years, the
threat or application of criminal sanction has been identified as a barrier
to health-seeking behaviour in a number of areas,1 including sex work,2
polygamy,3 sexual activity of people living with HIV,4 and various
aspects of drug control.5 How courts draw the constitutional landscape in
which health and criminal justice interact has important consequences for
health and criminal policy, and more broadly for how communities and
individuals shape their surroundings, which in turn can determine their
health. This paper advances the claim that the interpretation of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms6 should include consideration of the democratic legitimacy
with which health-affecting criminal policy is made and, in particular, the
role of those marginalized from ordinary democratic processes.
In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,7
the claimants sought to ensure the continued operation of Insite — North


Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University.
I leave aside a vast literature on the effects of criminal processes and incarceration themselves on physical and mental health.
2
Kim Blankenship & Stephen Koester, “Criminal Law, Policing Policy, and HIV Risk in
Female Sex Workers and Injection Drug Users” (2002) 30:4 J.L. Med. & Ethics 548. The negative
safety impacts of prostitution laws were also recognized in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186, at para. 111 (S.C.C.).
3
Angela Campbell, “Bountiful Voices” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 183.
4
Eric Mykhalovskiy, “The Problem of ‘Significant Risk’: Exploring the Public Health
Impact of Criminalizing HIV Non-disclosure” (2011) 73:5 Soc. Sci. Med. 668.
5
Thomas Kerr, Will Small & Evan Wood, “The Public Health and Social Impacts of Drug
Market Enforcement: A Review of the Evidence” (2005) 16:4 International Journal of Drug Policy
210 [hereinafter “Kerr, Small & Wood”].
6
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
[2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”].
1
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America’s first legally sanctioned safe injection site — without risking
criminal punishment for Insite’s staff and clients. Insite had its origins in
the grassroots movement for harm reduction in Vancouver’s Downtown
Eastside, and was ultimately endorsed and realized through collaboration
among local, federal and provincial authorities.8 After five years, Insite
was threatened with closure when the federal government refused to
renew the exemption from the application of federal drug laws under
which Insite had been operating. Insite’s supporters wanted to keep the
facility open for the simple reason that it was saving lives without
harming anyone. Criminal prohibitions on possession and trade in drugs,
the claimants argued, should not be permitted to threaten or interfere
with Insite’s good work.
The claimants in PHS were two Insite clients, a grassroots organization of people who use drugs, and the non-profit organization that
oversees the operation of the safe injection site. They moulded their
claims into two constitutionally cognizable forms. First, they made a
jurisdictional argument that the provincial policy establishing and
supporting the safe injection site ought to take precedence over federal
drug laws because provinces have legislative primacy over the regulation
of health. Second, they argued that Insite ought to be constitutionally
protected from federal drug laws because health, safety and life are
fundamental rights that, in the circumstances, should prevail over other
ends pursued by the criminal law. Remarkably, the claimants succeeded
at each level of court (albeit on different bases), with only one dissenting
judge at the Court of Appeal.9 The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately
ruled to prevent criminal drug possession laws from impeding Insite’s
operation on the basis of section 7 of the Charter.
I argue that in building and interpreting the emerging substantive
guarantee in section 7 of the Charter — that laws restricting life, liberty
or personal security cannot be arbitrary, overbroad or disproportionate —
justification and balancing between the means and ends of legislation
should be conducted in light of the democratic context in which policies
are created. Judicial legitimacy in setting and policing constitutional
boundaries in complex areas of social policy like state responses to
8
For a compelling narrative of how Insite was driven by grassroots efforts interacting with
institutional support, see Hester Lessard, “Jurisdictional Justice, Democracy, and the Story of Insite”
(2011) 19:3 Const Forum Const. 93, at 97-100 [hereinafter “Lessard”].
9
PHS Community Services Society v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] B.C.J. No. 951,
2008 BCSC 661 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Trial Level”]; PHS Community Services Society v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2010] B.C.J. No. 57, 2010 BCCA 15 (B.C.C.A.).
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potentially harmful drug use depends, certainly, on the strength and
nature of the factual evidence about whether policy is doing what it
purports to do. But it also depends on the relative democratic legitimacy
of competing policy options.
Courts defining and enforcing constitutional rights in complex areas
of social policy are, understandably, reluctant to substitute judicial views
for those of a democratically elected legislature. Yet some law-making
processes might better account for the perspectives of its constituents
than others. The broader arbitrariness analysis that I suggest would attend
to the ways in which policy-making processes include or exclude
marginalized and most-affected voices. If one underlying purpose of
constitutional rights is to prevent majoritarian oppression,10 then it makes
sense for courts to be more deferential to democratic decisions taken in
contexts that mitigate that oppression. In PHS, this means that the
Supreme Court made the right decision in finding that section 7 of the
Charter precludes the criminal law from interfering with Insite’s work. In
coming to that decision, however, it ought to have considered not only
the effectiveness of Insite in promoting health and safety relative to
blanket criminal prohibition, but also Insite’s unique democratic pedigree
and the democratic deficits affecting ordinary criminal legislation.
An evaluation of a law’s arbitrariness, overbreadth or proportionality
that responds to power imbalances within democratic institutions can be
understood to carry jurisdictional implications by favouring laws created
through processes that better account for the interests of those who may
be marginalized in ordinary political processes. In this way, Charter
analysis may develop to achieve what traditional jurisdictional analysis
has so far been unable to: the promotion of better representation in
decision making that affects fundamental issues like health.

II. BACKGROUND: DEMOCRACY, RIGHTS AND JURISDICTION
After the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided in favour of the
complainants on both Charter and division of powers grounds, a number
of scholars, however supportive of the outcome of the case, bemoaned
the narrow approach taken by the Court of Appeal majority on the

10
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 15-31.
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question of jurisdiction.11 Gillian Calder and Hester Lessard felt that the
justice claims which compelled the courts to support Insite’s continued
existence had been obscured by the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the
jurisdictional question. Applying the doctrine of “interjurisdictional
immunity”, the majority had held that Insite was a provincial undertaking
that fit within a “core” of provincial health powers, and that federal laws
could not limit it. The court had relied on textual analysis, restricting the
scope of its consideration narrowly to two levels of government —
federal and provincial. In doing so, the court had considered it irrelevant
to the jurisdictional question that Insite served the life-and-death needs
and had been created through the grass roots efforts of a group with
limited access to political processes.
Calling prevailing jurisdictional doctrine “arid”, “formal” and “technical”, Calder and Lessard urged a federalism doctrine that better serves
its underlying purpose of reconciling diversity and unity while furthering
democracy.12 Such a doctrine should take more substantive account of
political and social marginalization. This far more robust conceptualization of federalism — where law-making power is situated not only
according to where it is textually assigned, but according to where it
enjoys the most legitimacy — has ample support among scholars,13 but
has arguably played a limited role in shaping judicial doctrine.14
The division of powers argument was ultimately rejected by the
Supreme Court. The unanimous panel determined that interjurisdictional
immunity would not apply because it would have ousted the federal
competence to legislate in ways that would affect health. This, it held,
would be inconsistent with principles of cooperative federalism, as well
as the notion that regulating the use of drugs could not neatly be divided
into health questions within exclusive provincial competence and
criminal law questions within federal competence.15
Instead, the Supreme Court relied on the more explicitly valuesdriven Charter holding that the Minister’s refusal to grant an exemption
11
Lessard, supra, note 8, at 103-104; Gillian Calder, “Insite: Right Answer, Wrong Question” (2011) 19:3 Const. Forum Const. 113 [hereinafter “Calder”].
12
Calder, id.; Lessard, id.
13
See, e.g., Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Canadian Federal Experiment, or
Legalism Without Federalism? Toward a Legal Theory of Federalism” in Manuel Calvo-Garcia &
William Felstiner, eds., Federalismo / Federalism (Madrid: Dyckinson, 2004), at 81; Robert C. Post
& Reva B. Siegel, “Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation
of the Family and Medical Leave Act” (2003) 112:8 Yale L.J. 1943.
14
See, e.g., Eugénie Brouillet, “Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity:
Should We Open Pandora’s Box?” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 601.
15
PHS, supra, note 7, at paras. 67-70.
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from the application of criminal drug possession laws to Insite’s clients
and staff would arbitrarily and grossly disproportionately limit their
section 7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person.
In deciding the matter on Charter grounds, one might have expected
the Court’s decision to be more directly animated by concerns around the
protection of minorities and recognizing unique forms of grassroots and
democratic engagement that led to Insite’s creation in the first place. It
was not.
Calder and Lessard’s analysis of the poverty of jurisdictional analysis
suggests the broad argument I pursue in this paper: just as they argue
equality and democratic values ought to shape jurisdictional analysis, so
too should the interpretation of Charter rights be responsive to the
contextual democratic legitimacy of processes through which a facility
like Insite is created. In doing so, section 7 can play a role in assigning
law-making authority to the places in which it is most legitimate. Section
7 of the Charter could thus serve a jurisdictional function in contexts like
this one.

III. INSITE: A NARROW DECISION?
Given the many ways in which criminal law might negatively affect
health, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in
PHS was cabined.16 It has been argued that PHS presented relatively few
challenges to the judicial role on the facts.17 The Court was able to keep
its section 7 analysis narrow and shallow18 in two primary ways. First, it
side-stepped the issue of evaluating the constitutionality of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act19 itself, instead limiting its scrutiny to
the Federal Minister of Health’s discretionary decision to deny Insite an
exemption from the law under section 56 of the Act. Second, it kept its
focus on the evidence of Insite’s responsiveness to health and safety
issues specific to Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

16
See, e.g., Rahool P. Agarwal, “Case Comment: Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS
Community Services Society” (2011) 20:2 Const. Forum. Const. 41 [hereinafter “Agarwal”]
(suggesting that the decision may have little precedential value for new safe injection sites that might
seek to be established).
17
Jeremy Webber, “Section 7, Insite, and the Competence of Courts” (2011) 19:3 Const.
Forum Const. 125.
18
See Cass R. Sunstein, “Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided” (1996-1997) 110:4 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, at 14-23.
19
S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”].
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By shifting the focus away from the prohibitions themselves and toward the Minister of Health’s exercise of discretion under section 56 of
the Act,20 the Court avoided pronouncing on health-affecting criminal
offences outside the CDSA.21 The Court stated that “[i]f the Act consisted solely of blanket prohibitions with no provision for exemptions for
necessary medical or scientific use of drugs, the assertions that it was
arbitrary, overbroad, and disproportionate in its effects might gain some
traction”,22 adding that “the availability of [section 56] exemptions acts
as a safety valve that prevents the CDSA from applying where such
application would be arbitrary, overly broad, or grossly disproportionate
to its effects.”23
Most criminal offences do not benefit from health-related exemption
provisions like section 56. This leaves discretion in the application of the
law with police and prosecutors. Courts have so far maintained a very
deferential standard of review for police and prosecutorial discretion24
(although PHS might call this practice into question). Moreover, many of
the harms associated with criminalization of things like sex work, sexual
exposure of HIV or polygamy come from the mere threat of criminal
sanction. Finally, even in the context of drug control, where the section
56 exemption is available, not all circumstances lend themselves to the
section 56 process. For example, neighbourhood crackdowns have been
found to interfere with peoples’ own individual health-seeking behaviour,25 but it is difficult to imagine the application of a section 56
exemption that could practicably address those harms.
In addition, in finding the Minister’s exercise of discretion both arbitrary and grossly disproportionate to the CDSA’s purposes of protecting
health and safety, the Court relied on facts and circumstances specific to
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. First, traditional criminal prohibitions
on drug use were not working to protect health and safety in that area.26
20
The trial judge, by contrast, considered the Minister’s discretion under s. 56 of the Act to
be unfettered, and therefore confined his analysis to the constitutionality of the possession and
trafficking provisions alone. See PHS Trial Level, supra, note 9, at paras. 154-156.
21
PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 118 (distinguishing this case from R. v. Parker, [2000] O.J. No.
2787, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), in which the s. 56 mechanism was not yet sufficiently developed at
an administrative level for it to be of use to a claimant seeking to legally obtain medical marijuana).
22
Id., at para 109 (emphasis added).
23
Id., at para. 113.
24
See R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14, 2002 SCC 12, at paras. 166-169 (S.C.C.); Krieger
v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, 2002 SCC 65, at paras. 45-49 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nixon,
[2011] S.C.J. No. 34, 2011 SCC 34, at para. 64 (S.C.C.).
25
See Kerr, Small & Wood, supra, note 5.
26
PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 131.
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Insite had been introduced to respond to a crisis of increasing severity:
between 1987 and 1993, deaths from overdose per year had risen from
16 to 200. In 1996, HIV and Hepatitis C epidemics were reported. A
public health emergency was declared in 1997.27 Second, supervised
injection had been proven to minimize the risk of death and disease to
injection drug users.28 Finally, and most importantly in the Court’s view,
Insite in fact furthered, rather than undermined, the health and safety
purposes of the CDSA. It had intervened in 336 overdoses since 2006,
and encouraged clients to seek counselling, detoxification and treatment,
all without increasing local crime rates, incidents of public injection, or
relapse rates of injection drug users.29 In other words, the Supreme Court
found that on the facts, closely examined, there was no reason to believe
that the denial would further the CDSA’s objectives.
The court’s heavy reliance on the particular circumstances in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside, and on the proven benefits of Insite during
the period in which it did operate under a section 56 exemption, has led
some commentators to conclude that its impact on health-affecting
criminal laws may be limited.30 There is no other area in Canada that
resembles the open-air drug market of the Downtown Eastside. And of
course, without an initial section 56 exemption, it may be difficult for
other would-be safe injection sites to demonstrate their contextual
effectiveness or the lack of negative neighbourhood impacts. On its face,
the decision falls well short of recognizing, for example, a free-standing
right of people who use drugs to access suitable, evidence-based health
services free from criminal law interference, much less to recognizing
any democratic superiority of the unique collaboration between grass
roots and government actors that led to Insite’s creation over the ordinary
democratic processes that generated the CDSA.

IV. INSITE: A DOCTRINAL EXPANSION
Despite the limitations outlined above, the Court was in some ways
bolder than might have been expected from previous Supreme Court

27
28
29
30

Id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 131.
Id.
Agarwal, supra, note 16.
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jurisprudence. First, it showed no deference at all to a ministerial
decision that was, on the face of the statute, a discretionary one.31
Second, it undertook a far more searching review of the facts supporting the Minister’s decision than some prior judicial decisions on the
arbitrariness standard would have suggested. In R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v.
Caine, for example, the government had successfully defended marijuana
possession laws against a recreational user’s allegations of arbitrariness
by demonstrating simply that the law was “rationally connected to a
reasonable apprehension of harm”.32 Relying on a belief that “marijuana
can cause problems of varying nature and severity to some people”, the
Supreme Court stated: “we think the Charter allows Parliament a broad,
though certainly not unlimited, legislative capacity to respond.”33
Following Malmo-Levine, the Court in PHS might have upheld the
decision on the (blinkered) basis that some people might be discouraged
from using drugs by the exception-free application of the possession laws
in the CDSA. Instead, the Court looked beyond the conceptual relationship between the CDSA prohibition on drug possession and the health
and safety of Insite’s clients to evaluate whether the Minister’s decision
was arbitrary.
The expansion of section 7 scrutiny of substantive criminal prohibitions beyond the notional relationships of a piece of legislation’s means
to its ends opens up new possibilities for Charter review on the basis of
the social impact of criminal justice policy. It also risks generating
concern about judicial overstepping, to which the Court in PHS was
alive:
The issue of illegal drug use and addiction is a complex one which
attracts a variety of social, political, scientific and moral reactions.
There is room for disagreement between reasonable people concerning
how addiction should be treated. It is for relevant governments, not the
Court, to make criminal and health policy.34

In fact, PHS is not the first Supreme Court decision to require that
section 7 arbitrariness be evaluated with close attention to legislation’s

31
See Kent Roach, “The Supreme Court’s Remedial Decision in the Insite Decision”
(2012) 6 J. Parl. & Polit. L. 238. For a discussion of the tensions inherent to Charter review of
exercises of statutory discretion, see David Mullan, “Section 7 and Administrative Law Deference:
No Room at the Inn?” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 227.
32
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 136 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
33
Id., at para. 135.
34
PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 105 (S.C.C.).
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effectiveness in reality. In Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),35 the
Court famously struck down the Quebec government’s prohibition on
obtaining private health insurance for publicly ensured services for
violating the Quebec Charter. Three of the four majority judges also
found that the prohibition was arbitrary and violated section 7 of the
Canadian Charter. They based their decision on their own finding,
contrary to that of the trial judge, that the insurance prohibition, however
rationally connected to the protection of the public health care system,
was not in fact necessary on a close examination of the evidence. This
position was justified primarily with reference to how other Western
democracies managed to maintain effective public health care systems
without such prohibitions.36 And indeed, the decision was subjected to
sharp criticism for judicial misapprehension of the facts.37 Critics
contended that there was plenty of evidence suggesting that expanding
access to private health care would negatively affect the public health
care system, and that the Court was improperly imposing its own
ideology rather than objectively evaluating that evidence.38
The turn to closer scrutiny of the impacts of legislation in the arbitrariness/overbreadth/disproportionality analysis is welcome. But, as
suggested by the previous section, it can be difficult and costly for
applicants to build a strong evidence-based record to support a Charter
challenge, particularly where they are members of poor and marginalized
groups. Martha Jackman has convincingly argued that such applicants
tend to carry a much higher burden of proof than the government in
similar constitutional cases.39 In the next section, I argue that the evidential burden on claimants in a case like PHS should be eased where they
are urging courts to overrule a legislative policy created through ordinary
democratic processes (like the CDSA) with one created with special

35

[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
Id., at paras. 134-149.
37
See, e.g., Hamish Stewart, “Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional
Cases” in Colleen Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 209; Charles J. Wright, “Different Interpretations of
‘Evidence’ and Implications for the Canadian Healthcare System”, id., at 220; Theodore R. Marmor,
“Canada’s Supreme Court and its National Health Insurance Program: Evaluating the Landmark
Chaoulli Decision from a Comparative Perspective” (2006) 44:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 311.
38
See, e.g., Christopher Manfredi, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of
Judicial Policymaking” in Access to Care, Access to Justice, id., 139.
39
Martha Jackman, “Reality Checks: Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in Charter
Welfare Cases” in Margot Young, Susan Boyd & Sheilagh Day, eds., Poverty Rights, Social
Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 24.
36
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attention to, and participation of, marginalized groups (like the process
that generated Insite).

V. ON JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND LEGITIMACY IN SUBSTANTIVE
REVIEW OF HEALTH-AFFECTING CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS
The Court in PHS limited its explicit reliance on social science evidence to information about the effects of Insite on its clients and the
surrounding community. But deference need not depend solely on the
strength of the social science evidence about means and ends. If the basis
for judicial deference in areas like this one is concern about courts’
relative capacity and legitimacy to intervene in complex questions of
social policy (here, the proper response to the health and public safety
questions around drug use), then courts should consider those capacity
and legitimacy concerns in determining the level of deference they owe
governments in a given situation.40 Justice Deschamps’ reasons in
Chaoulli affirm this, even if the Court did not apply its own principles
satisfactorily:
The court’s reasons for showing deference must always reflect the two
guiding principles of justification: the measure must be consistent with
democratic values and it must be necessary to maintain public order
and the general well-being of citizens. The variety of circumstances
that may be presented to a court is not conducive to the rigidity of an
exhaustive list.41

In PHS, the Court did not advert directly to the democratic legitimacy of Insite itself in the context of its arbitrariness analysis. In the
introductory paragraphs to the decision, however, the Court notes the
democratic pedigree of North America’s first legally sanctioned safe
injection site: “Insite was the product of cooperative federalism. Local,
provincial and federal authorities combined their efforts to create it. It
was launched as an experiment. That experiment has proven successful.”42 Ultimately, it is the success of Insite, and not the circumstances

40
Cf. Lorne M. Sossin, Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada
(Toronto: Thomson Canada Limited, 1999), at 233-37 (suggesting that courts ought to determine
justiciability on a case-by-case basis, depending on whether they have the institutional capacity and
legitimacy to adjudicate the claim).
41
Chaoulli, supra, note 35, at para. 93 (emphasis added).
42
PHS, supra, note 7, at para. 19.
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through which it was created or the marginalization of the population it
serves, that forms the basis of the Court’s section 7 decision.
And yet, a number of features underscore Insite’s legitimacy as an
experiment in local democracy. First, it was created through grassroots
organizing.43 The Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (“VANDU”)
represented and was comprised of members from the most marginalized
groups whose interests are least likely to be represented in traditional
elected government. In addition, Insite was made possible by the provincial transfer of responsibility for adult alcohol and drug services to
regional health authorities. Giving local communities a greater say in
health policies that affect them and ensuring evidence-based health
practices were among the key purposes underlying regionalization of
health service design and priority setting.44 Regionalization grew out of
the perception that health care resource distribution needed to be more
democratically responsive.
This case can thus be distinguished from Chaoulli. There, the Court
replaced a decision made through ordinary democratic processes (the
provincial ban on insurance) with the Court’s perceived default “state of
nature” (the freedom to obtain private insurance). It justified its decision
with reference to its own (much criticized) factual findings that the
insurance ban threatened lives in the context of insufficient resources
within the health care system, and that the insurance ban was not
necessary to protect the integrity of the public health care system.45 The
Court did gesture toward some facts supporting the democratic legitimacy of its decision. It noted, for example, that the provincial government had already recognized and committed itself to fixing the problem
of wait times within the public health care system.46 In other words, the
Court relied on evidence that its decision had already been supported by
a government that was dragging its heels and failing to take action on a
problem it recognized. But relative to PHS, the democratic legitimacy of
the Court’s decision to strike down the provincial insurance ban was
weak.

43

See Lessard, supra, note 8.
Steven Lewis & Denise Kouri, “Regionalization: Making Sense of the Canadian Experience” (2004) 5 HealthCare Papers 12, at 15-20; Colleen Flood, Duncan Sinclair & Joanna Erdman,
“Steering and Rowing in Health Care: The Devolution Option” (2004) 30:1 Queen’s L.J. 156;
Jonathan Lomas, “Devolving Authority for Health Care in Canada’s Provinces: 4. Emerging Issues
and Prospects” (1997) Can. Med. Assoc. J. 817, at 818.
45
Chaoulli, supra, note 35, at para. 106; see contra, supra, note 37.
46
Chaoulli, id., at para. 96.
44
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In PHS, the Court was asked to choose between two democratically
supported options. On the one hand was the Minister’s decision to
maintain criminal law obstacles to Insite’s operation, a capacity that
derives its authority from ordinary democratic processes at the federal
level. On the other was a facility established through the collaboration of
multiple levels of government authority and the participation of those
most affected by the appeal’s success or failure. The Court thus overruled
a Minister’s decision that not only ignored overwhelming scientific
evidence of Insite’s effectiveness and placed lives at risk, but was
democratic only in the sense that it emanated from the discretion of a
Minister whose authority derived from the democratically elected federal
government. In a contest of relative democratic legitimacy, the provincial
policy arguably won.
Discussion of the relative democratic legitimacy of Insite was nowhere to be seen in the section 7 arbitrariness/overbreadth analysis. But
it represents the other half of a principled approach to managing deference in these kinds of claims: not only should the measure be sufficiently
related to its objective on the facts, it should also be consistent with
democratic principles.47 Relative democratic legitimacy may also more
fully explain the disposition of the case in light of the emphasis the Court
placed in its introductory paragraphs on: (a) the unique collaborative and
participatory process that generated Insite; and (b) the extraordinary
marginalization of the community that Insite served.48
There are two principal ways in which democratic legitimacy might
factor into section 7 adjudication. A court might consider relative
democratic legitimacy as it sets the level of deference it will give to a
challenged law or policy as an expression of democratic choice. Thus, for
example, the court might maintain the Chaoulli rule that a law is arbitrary where it fails to align with its goals in practice, but exercise less
strict scrutiny of that alignment where that law is created through efforts
designed to compensate for democratic deficits in ordinary law-making
processes. Where, as here, the law in question is made through ordinary
democratic processes, the court might more closely scrutinize the
means/end fit and be more likely to find it unsatisfactory where there is a
competing, constitutional and more effective policy that does a better job
representing marginalized voices.

47
48

See supra, notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
PHS, supra, note 7, at paras. 7-9.
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A bolder and perhaps more honest approach would explicitly recognize democratic legitimacy within or among the principles of fundamental justice, while acknowledging that such legitimacy is a relative
concept. In other words, courts might require that laws limiting life,
liberty and security of the person be relatively democratically legitimate
in order not to run afoul of section 7 as a principle of fundamental
justice. Certainly, democratic rule with attention to minority exclusion
would count among the “basic tenets of our legal system”.49
The marginalization of particular groups from ordinary law-making
processes could likewise be addressed within the concept of arbitrariness.
Arbitrariness would be enlarged from its present meaning under section 7
— state power wielded in a manner that is insufficiently connected to the
goals it purports to serve — to include power wielded by a majority
without sufficient consideration of and representation from most-affected
and marginalized actors. This would accord with understandings of
arbitrariness that focus on unrestrained, autocratic or overweening use of
authority — tyrannical majoritarianism.
A possible objection to this suggestion is that the focus on democratic legitimacy might undermine the strength of individual rights claims
to protect minority positions. One can easily imagine how some community initiatives might become oppressive to some groups in the future.
Should courts support such initiatives simply because they appear to
enjoy more democratic legitimacy understood as grassroots engagement
beyond electoral participation?
I suggest that courts might avoid the trap of diluting rights or reinforcing oppressive democratic choice by keeping the focus on the goal of
protecting against health-affecting policy choices that are of questionable
effectiveness and represent overweening majoritarianism. Only those
grass roots efforts that favour traditionally underrepresented groups and
individuals would qualify as democracy-enhancing. Careful attention to
context is necessary here.

VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that section 7 of the Charter should have
jurisdictional implications in the sense that it should favour more
participatorily created schemes, ones with greater democratic legitimacy
49
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
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broadly understood, particularly in relation to groups that are marginalized from ordinary political processes. This is not to suggest that the
demonstrated success of harm reduction or other approaches to health
and well-being that may require the withdrawal of criminal solutions
should not matter. They do. But where the factual record is not as full —
and indeed, for reasons explained earlier, future challenges may not
benefit from the same rich factual record50 — courts should remember to
measure their own institutional competence to intervene on a case-bycase basis, bearing in mind the extent to which concerns about judicial
meddling in democratic decision making might, as here, be mitigated.
The recent passing of Bill C-10 is expected to generate a number of
constitutional challenges in relation to mandatory minimum sentences,
prison conditions and the disparate impact of amendments on Aboriginal
persons and people requiring mental health care.51 Quebec Minister of
Justice Jean-Marc Fournier has announced his intention to do everything
he can to soften the impact of Bill C-10 in Quebec.52 The Charter may
prove to be a novel lens through which to consider jurisdictional justice.

50

See supra, notes 27 to 32 and accompanying text.
See Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Bill C-10, The Omnibus Crime Bill: Unwise,
Unjust, Unconstitutional”, online: <http://www.ccla.org/omnibus-crime-bill-c-10/>.
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“Quebec Vows to Limit Clout of Conservative Crime Bill” Canadian Press (March 12
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